### Plan: The United States federal government should increase economic engagement toward Mexico through an economic investment fund.

### Advantage 1: North American Integration

#### North American regional economic strength is vulnerable. A breakdown of cooperation with Mexico would cause the decline of American power.

Clarkson & Mildenberger ‘11 Stephen Clarkson, professor of political economy, University of Toronto, and former fellow, Woodrow Wilson Center Matto Mildenberger, Ph.D. student, Yale School of Forestry and Environmental Studies Dependent America?: How Canada and Mexico Construct Us Power p. 272

The United States’ relationship with Canada and Mexico thus presents a paradox. Does North America Exist? showed that globalization was reducing the salience of North America as an economic entity, whether in the steel sector ‘s global restructuring or in the international consolidation of banking regulations. However, even as North American regionalism falters, the United States’ immediate periphery is becoming an more important partner in sustaining its material power. Constrained by its global partners’ superior growth rates, the United States can still count on the unusually beneficial economic relationship it quietly maintains with its continental periphery. Although it normally ignores its neighbors’ interests when dealing with other countries, its gradual decline no longer affords Washington this luxury without having to pay the price of its two neighbors expanding their strategic gaze from the continent to the world. Canada and Mexico are endeavoring to strengthen their economic links with other countries. Indian capital is already investing in iron-ore extraction in Quebec, while Chinese firms are staking out Alberta’s tar sands. Even with disputes over Newfound land’s seal industry and its visa restrictions on Czech visitors, Canada has busily negotiated a comprehensive economic trade agreement with the European Union. Hosting the G-20 Economic Summit in 2012, Mexico is positioning itself as the champion of emerging economies and the developing world. This economic internationalization could mitigate Canada’s and Mexico’s lopsided dependencies on a US market to which their access has been curtailed since 9/11. Should they succeed in diversifying their economic links by attracting more FDI from overseas and should their extra-regional imports and exports abroad begin to expand more than their intra-regional trade, the United States’ economic perimeter in North America will contract, and their construction of US material strength will ipso facto diminish. The North American periphery has been Uncle Sam’s gold-laying goose for as long as most can remember. It would make an ironic epitaph for the United States’ hegemonic decline if alienating its most valuable and easily cultivated foreign asset accelerated its self-induced fall.

#### The plan will accelerate effective investment in Mexico and provide a foundation for North American integration

Pastor ‘8 – Prof and founding director of the Center for North American Studies

Robert, The Future of North America, July/August, <http://www.american.edu/sis/cnas/upload/ForeignAffairs_Pastor_On_NA_072008.pdf>, CMR

Another challenge is to narrow the gap in income that separates¶ Mexico from its northern neighbors by creating a North American¶ investment fund. The fund should target $20 billion a year to connect¶ central and southern Mexico to the United States with roads, ports,¶ and communications. With the goal of building a North American¶ Community, all three governments should commit to narrowing the¶ income gap, with each deciding how it could best contribute. Since¶ it will beneﬁt the most, Mexico should consider contribute half of¶ the money for the fund and also undertake reforms—ﬁscal, energy,¶ and labor—to ensure that the resources would be effectively used. The¶ United States should contribute each year 40 percent of the fund’s¶ resources—less than half the cost each week of the war in Iraq—and¶ Canada, 10 percent. Since naftawas put into place, the northern part¶ of Mexico has grown ten times as fast as the southern part because it¶ is connected to the Canadian and U.S. markets. North America can¶ wait a hundred years for southern Mexico to catch up, or it can help¶ accelerate Mexico’s development—which would have positive consequences¶ in terms of reducing emigration, expanding trade, and investing in¶ infrastructure to help Mexico enter the developed world.¶ North America’s model of integration is diªerent from Europe’s.¶ It respects the market more and trusts bureaucracy less. Still, some¶ institutions are needed to develop continental proposals, monitor¶ progress, and enforce compliance. The three leaders should institutionalize summit meetings at least annually, and they should establish a North¶ American commission composed of independent and distinguished¶ leaders from academia, civil society, business, labor, and agriculture¶ and with an independent research capacity. The commission should¶ oªer continental proposals to the three leaders. who would¶ continue to be staffed by their respective governments, but would¶ respond to a continental, rather than a dual-bilateral, agenda. The¶ commission should develop a North American plan for transportation¶ and infrastructure and plans on labor, agriculture, the environment,¶ energy, immigration, drug tra⁄cking, and borders.¶ The three heads of state must also commit to building a new¶ consciousness, a new way of thinking about one’s neighbors and¶ about the continental agenda. Americans, Canadians, and Mexicans¶ can be nationals and North Americans at the same time. Indeed,¶ an appreciation of one’s neighbors as part of a compelling North¶ American idea could enhance the prestige of each country.To educate¶ a new generation of students to think North American, each country¶ should begin by supporting a dozen centers for North American¶ studies. Each center should educate students, undertake research,¶ and foster exchanges with other North American universities for¶ both students and faculty.¶ This is a formidable agenda that could transform North America¶ and each of its states. It is not possible without a vision, and it is not¶ feasible without real leadership and credible institutions. But with all¶ three, a North American Community can be built. The existence of¶ such a community would mean that the United States would consult¶ its neighbors on important issues that aªected them. It would mean¶ that Canada would work closely with Mexico to build rule-based¶ institutions and to develop a formula for closing the development¶ gap. It would mean that Mexico would undertake reforms to make¶ good use of the additional resources.¶ This is a very diªerent agenda than seeking to improve working¶ conditions and the environment by rewriting nafta and threatening¶ to increase tariªs. Labor and environmental issues should be part of¶ the North American dialogue working to improve the continent, but¶ there is no evidence that foreign investors move to Mexico in order¶ to take advantage of lax labor and environmental rules. Quite the¶ contrary: Mexico’s labor laws are so rigid that they often discourage¶ foreign investors. Moreover, they incorporate the eight core international labor standards, whereas the United States has not approved¶ six of them. As for its environmental laws, Mexico maintains standards that are quite good; the problem is that it lacks funds for enforcement or cleanup.¶ The immigration issue also needs to be addressed in this broader¶ context. A fence is needed in some places, but building a 700-mile¶ wall would be more insulting than eªective. If the United States is¶ going to try to forge a community, it needs to articulate an approach¶ that acknowledges that it is complicit in the immigration problem in¶ hiring illegal immigrants, who work harder for less. More important, if¶ the United States were to join with Mexico in a serious commitment¶ to narrow the income gap, then cooperation over other issues would¶ become possible. The best place to enforce immigration policy is in¶ the workplace, not at the border, but national, biometric identiﬁcation¶ cards will be needed for everyone to make the policy eªective, and a¶ path to legalization will be needed to make it just.

#### Growing strong regional relations is a prerequisite to continued US power projection and supremacy.

Pastor 12 Robert A. Pastor is professor and director of the Center for North American Studies at American University. Pastor served as National Security Advisor on Latin America during the Carter Administration. “Beyond the Continental Divide” From the July/August 2012 issue of The American Interest http://www.the-american-interest.com/article.cfm?piece=1269

Most Americans think that the largest markets for U.S. exports are China and Japan, and that may explain the Obama Administration’s Asian initiative. But the truth is that Canada and Mexico are the top two markets for U.S. exports. Most Americans also think that Saudi Arabia and Venezuela are the largest sources of our energy imports, but again, Canada and Mexico are more important. And again, we think that most tourists who come and spend money here are European and Asian, but more than half are Canadians and Mexicans. A similar percentage of Americans who travel abroad go to our two neighbors. All in all, no two nations are more important for the U.S. economy than our two closest neighbors. From the perspective of U.S. national security, too, recall for a moment that Mexico and Canada made an historic gamble in signing NAFTA. Already dependent on the behemoth next door and wary of the imbalance of power, both countries feared that NAFTA could make them more vulnerable. Still, they hoped that the United States would be obligated to treat them on an equal and reciprocal basis and that they would prosper from the agreement. Canadians and Mexicans have begun to question whether they made the right choice. There are, of course, a wealth of ways to measure the direct and indirect impact of NAFTA, but political attention, not without justification, tends to focus on violations of the agreement. The U.S. government violated NAFTA by denying Mexican trucks the right to enter the United States for 16 years, relenting in the most timid way, and only after Mexico was permitted by the World Trade Organization to retaliate in October 2011. And for more than a decade, Washington failed to comply with decisions made by a dispute-settlement mechanism regarding imports of soft-wood lumber from Canada. More recently, the United States decided to build a huge wall to keep out Mexicans, and after a three-year process of reviewing the environmental impact of the Keystone XL pipeline from western Canada to the Gulf of Mexico, this past December 2011 President Obama decided to postpone the decision for another year. This is the sort of treatment likely to drive both Canada and Mexico to conclude that depending on the United States was the wrong decision. Imagine for a moment what might happen if Canada and Mexico came to such a conclusion. Canada might divert its energy exports to China, especially if China guaranteed a long-term relationship at a good price. it would diversify with South America and China and might be less inclined to keep America’s rivals, like Iran, at arm’s length. Is there anyone who thinks these developments would not set off national security alarms? A very old truth would quickly reassert itself: The United States can project its power into Asia, Europe and the Middle East in part because it need not worry about its neighbors. A new corollary of that truth would not be far behind: Canada and Mexico are far more important to the national security of the United States than Iraq and Afghanistan. Beyond the economy and national security, our two neighbors have societal ties to the United States that make all other ethnic connections seem lean in comparison. By 2015, there will be about 35 million people in the United States who were either born in Mexico or whose parents were born in Mexico; that number exceeds the total population of Canada. Canadians in the United States don’t stand out as much as do Mexicans, but nearly a million Canadians live in the United States. And more Americans live in Mexico than in any other foreign country. In sum, the economy, national security and society of the United States, Mexico and Canada are far more intertwined than most U.S., Canadian and Mexican citizens realize. Most Americans haven’t worried about Mexico in strategic terms since the days of Pancho Villa, or about Canada since the 1814 Battle of Plattsburgh. That’s unwise. Bad relations with either country, let alone both, would be disastrous. On the other hand, deeper relations could be vastly beneficial. We don’t seem ready to recognize that truth either.

#### Loss of American power projection capacity causes global war.

Brooks, Ikenberry, and Wohlforth ’13 (Stephen, Associate Professor of Government at Dartmouth College, John Ikenberry is the Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University, William C. Wohlforth is the Daniel Webster Professor in the Department of Government at Dartmouth College “Don’t Come Home America: The Case Against Retrenchment,” International Security, Vol. 37, No. 3 (Winter 2012/13), pp. 7–51)

A core premise of deep engagement prevents the emergence of a far more dangerous global security environment. For one thing, as noted above, the United States’ overseas presence gives it the leverage to restrain partners from taking provocative action. Perhaps more important, its core alliance commitments also deter states with aspirations to regional hegemony from contemplating expansion and make its partners more secure, reducing their incentive to adopt solutions to their security problems that threaten others and thus stoke security dilemmas. The contention that engaged U.S. power dampens the baleful effects of anarchy is consistent with influential variants of realist theory. Indeed, arguably the scariest portrayal of the war-prone world that would emerge absent the “American Pacifier” is provided in the works of John Mearsheimer, who forecasts dangerous multipolar regions replete with security competition, arms races, nuclear proliferation and associated preventive war temptations, regional rivalries, and even runs at regional hegemony and full-scale great power war. 72 How do retrenchment advocates, the bulk of whom are realists, discount this benefit? Their arguments are complicated, but two capture most of the variation: (1) U.S. security guarantees are not necessary to prevent dangerous rivalries and conflict in Eurasia; or (2) prevention of rivalry and conflict in Eurasia is not a U.S. interest. Each response is connected to a different theory or set of theories, which makes sense given that the whole debate hinges on a complex future counterfactual (what would happen to Eurasia’s security setting if the United States truly disengaged?). Although a certain answer is impossible, each of these responses is nonetheless a weaker argument for retrenchment than advocates acknowledge. The first response flows from defensive realism as well as other international relations theories that discount the conflict-generating potential of anarchy under contemporary conditions. 73 Defensive realists maintain that the high expected costs of territorial conquest, defense dominance, and an array of policies and practices that can be used credibly to signal benign intent, mean that Eurasia’s major states could manage regional multipolarity peacefully without the American pacifier. Retrenchment would be a bet on this scholarship, particularly in regions where the kinds of stabilizers that nonrealist theories point to—such as democratic governance or dense institutional linkages—are either absent or weakly present. There are three other major bodies of scholarship, however, that might give decisionmakers pause before making this bet. First is regional expertise. Needless to say, there is no consensus on the net security effects of U.S. withdrawal. Regarding each region, there are optimists and pessimists. Few experts expect a return of intense great power competition in a post-American Europe, but many doubt European governments will pay the political costs of increased EU defense cooperation and the budgetary costs of increasing military outlays. 74 The result might be a Europe that is incapable of securing itself from various threats that could be destabilizing within the region and beyond (e.g., a regional conflict akin to the 1990s Balkan wars), lacks capacity for global security missions in which U.S. leaders might want European participation, and is vulnerable to the influence of outside rising powers. What about the other parts of Eurasia where the United States has a substantial military presence? Regarding the Middle East, the balance begins to swing toward pessimists concerned that states currently backed by Washington— notably Israel, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia—might take actions upon U.S. retrenchment that would intensify security dilemmas. And concerning East Asia, pessimism regarding the region’s prospects without the American pacifier is pronounced. Arguably the principal concern expressed by area experts is that Japan and South Korea are likely to obtain a nuclear capacity and increase their military commitments, which could stoke a destabilizing reaction from China. It is notable that during the Cold War, both South Korea and Taiwan moved to obtain a nuclear weapons capacity and were only constrained from doing so by a still-engaged United States. 75 The second body of scholarship casting doubt on the bet on defensive realism’s sanguine portrayal is all of the research that undermines its conception of state preferences. Defensive realism’s optimism about what would happen if the United States retrenched is very much dependent on its particular—and highly restrictive—assumption about state preferences; once we relax this assumption, then much of its basis for optimism vanishes. Specifically, the prediction of post-American tranquility throughout Eurasia rests on the assumption that security is the only relevant state preference, with security defined narrowly in terms of protection from violent external attacks on the homeland. Under that assumption, the security problem is largely solved as soon as offense and defense are clearly distinguishable, and offense is extremely expensive relative to defense. Burgeoning research across the social and other sciences, however, undermines that core assumption: .states have preferences not only for security but also for prestige, status, and other aims, and they engage in trade-offs among the various objectives. 76 In addition, they define security not just in terms of territorial protection but in view of many and varied milieu goals. It follows that even states that are relatively secure may nevertheless engage in highly competitive behavior. Empirical studies show that this is indeed sometimes the case. 77 In sum, a bet on a benign postretrenchment Eurasia is a bet that leaders of major countries will never allow these nonsecurity preferences to influence their strategic choices. To the degree that these bodies of scholarly knowledge have predictive leverage, U.S. retrenchment would result in a significant deterioration in the security environment in at least some of the world’s key regions. We have already mentioned the third, even more alarming body of scholarship. Offensive realism predicts that the withdrawal of the American pacifier will yield either a competitive regional multipolarity complete with associated insecurity, arms racing, crisis instability, nuclear proliferation, and the like, or bids for regional hegemony, which may be beyond the capacity of local great powers to contain (and which in any case would generate intensely competitive behavior, possibly including regional great power war). Hence it is unsurprising that retrenchment advocates are prone to focus on the second argument noted above: that avoiding wars and security dilemmas in the world’s core regions is not a U.S. national interest. Few doubt that the United States could survive the return of insecurity and conflict among Eurasian powers, but at what cost? Much of the work in this area has focused on the economic externalities of a renewed threat of insecurity and war, which we discuss below. Focusing on the pure security ramifications, there are two main reasons why decision makers may be rationally reluctant to run the retrenchment experiment. First, overall higher levels of conflict make the world a more dangerous place. Were Eurasia to return to higher levels of interstate military competition, one would see overall higher levels of military spending and innovation and a higher likelihood of competitive regional proxy wars and arming of client states—all of which would be concerning, in part because it would promote a faster diffusion of military power away from the United States. Greater regional insecurity could well feed proliferation cascades, as states such as Egypt, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Saudi Arabia all might choose to create nuclear forces. 78 It is unlikely that proliferation decisions by any of these actors would be the end of the game: they would likely generate pressure locally for more proliferation. Following Kenneth Waltz, many retrenchment advocates are proliferation optimists, assuming that nuclear deterrence solves the security problem. 79 Usually carried out in dyadic terms, the debate over the stability of proliferation changes as the numbers go up. Proliferation optimism rests on assumptions of rationality and narrow security preferences. In social science, however, such assumptions are inevitably probabilistic. Optimists assume that most states are led by rational leaders, most will overcome organizational problems and resist the temptation to preempt before feared neighbors nuclearize, and most pursue only security and are risk averse. Confidence in such probabilistic assumptions declines if the world were to move from nine to twenty, thirty, or forty nuclear states. In addition, many of the other dangers noted by analysts who are concerned about the destabilizing effects of nuclear proliferation—including the risk of accidents and the prospects that some new nuclear powers will not have truly survivable forces—seem prone to go up as the number of nuclear powers grows. 80 Moreover, the risk of “unforeseen crisis dynamics” that could spin out of control is also higher as the number of nuclear powers increases. Finally, add to these concerns the enhanced danger of nuclear leakage, and a world with overall higher levels of security competition becomes yet more worrisome. The argument that maintaining Eurasian peace is not a U.S. interest faces a second problem. On widely accepted realist assumptions, acknowledging that U.S. engagement preserves peace dramatically narrows the difference between retrenchment and deep engagement. For many supporters of retrenchment, the optimal strategy for a power such as the United States, which has attained regional hegemony and is separated from other great powers by oceans, is offshore balancing: stay over the horizon and “pass the buck” to local powers to do the dangerous work of counterbalancing any local rising power. The United States should commit to onshore balancing only when local balancing is likely to fail and a great power appears to be a credible contender for regional hegemony, as in the cases of Germany, Japan, and the Soviet Union in the midtwentieth century. The problem is that China’s rise puts the possibility of its attaining regional hegemony on the table, at least in the medium to long term. As Mearsheimer notes, “The United States will have to play a key role in countering China, because its Asian neighbors are not strong enough to do it by themselves.” 81 Therefore, unless China’s rise stalls, “the United States is likely to act toward China similar to the way it behaved toward the Soviet Union during the Cold War.” 82 It follows that the United States should take no action that would compromise its capacity to move to onshore balancing in the future. It will need to maintain key alliance relationships in Asia as well as the formidably expensive military capacity to intervene there. The implication is to get out of Iraq and Afghanistan, reduce the presence in Europe, and pivot to Asia— just what the United States is doing. 83 In sum, the argument that U.S. security commitments are unnecessary for peace is countered by a lot of scholarship, including highly influential realist scholarship. In addition, the argument that Eurasian peace is unnecessary for U.S. security is weakened by the potential for a large number of nasty security consequences as well as the need to retain a latent onshore balancing capacity that dramatically reduces the savings retrenchment might bring. Moreover, switching between offshore and onshore balancing could well be difªcult. Bringing together the thrust of many of the arguments discussed so far underlines the degree to which the case for retrenchment misses the underlying logic of the deep engagement strategy. By supplying reassurance, deterrence, and active management, the United States lowers security competition in the world’s key regions, thereby preventing the emergence of a hothouse atmosphere for growing new military capabilities. Alliance ties dissuade partners from ramping up and also provide leverage to prevent military transfers to potential rivals. On top of all this, the United States’ formidable military machine may deter entry by potential rivals. Current great power military expenditures as a percentage of GDP are at historical lows, and thus far other major powers have shied away from seeking to match top-end U.S. military capabilities. In addition, they have so far been careful to avoid attracting the “focused enmity” of the United States. 84 All of the world’s most modern militaries are U.S. allies (America’s alliance system of more than sixty countries now accounts for some 80 percent of global military spending), and the gap between the U.S. military capability and that of potential rivals is by many measures growing rather than shrinking. 85

### Advantage 2: Energy

North American energy sector is at a turning point – increased investment in Mexico’s energy sector is critical to reduce power of US adversaries

Keppel 13

Stephen, “U.S., Mexico and Canada Could Become Energy Independent”, April 17, <http://abcnews.go.com/ABC_Univision/us-mexico-canada-verge-energy-independence/story?id=18942259#.UdSsLvm1FiK>, CMR

Just seven years after President George W. Bush lamented the United States' addiction to foreign oil, we are on the verge of energy independence. The United States and Canada are in the midst of a boom in oil and gas production at the same time that U.S. fuel consumption is falling. The result is turning energy markets on their heads.¶ Add to that the potential for energy reform in Mexico, which many believe would unleash a surge in exploration and production, and North America is positioned to become a global energy powerhouse.¶ U.S. oil production is at its highest level in 20 years, while its oil demand is at a 17-year low. According to a recent Citigroup report, in just five years the U.S. may no longer need to import oil from any source but Canada.¶ Driving the North American oil boom are technological innovation and increased investment. New production techniques like horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing, or "fracking", have allowed producers to extract oil and gas from rock formations that were previously thought to be impenetrable. Oil and gas production has jumped in states like North Dakota, Ohio and Pennsylvania, which together are producing 1.5 million barrels of oil a day. That total rivals the output of major producers like Venezuela, which is currently exporting around 1.6 million barrels per day.¶ What would North American energy independence actually mean?¶ In the most basic terms, the U.S. would no longer have to rely on importing oil from countries that are hostile to its interests. Continued increases in production would also decrease global prices which would reduce the power of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), which includes top producers like Saudi Arabia, Iran and Venezuela.¶ According to Ed Morse, Citigroup's Head of Commodities Research, the average price of a barrel of oil could drop to the $70-$90 range (prices are currently around $95 per barrel, down from $112 per barrel in 2012).¶ The U.S. economy would be a clear winner. The boom has already resulted in lower natural gas prices, boosting U.S. industry and helping the economy rebound from the Great Recession. The reduced cost of oil would also benefit the non-oil producers in Central America and the Caribbean.¶ Mexico, meanwhile, is in a more precarious position. If it is able to better integrate itself in the U.S.-Canadian energy market and open up its state-run oil industry, it could reap the benefits of lower prices and increased investment. There are a lot of wells on the Mexican side of the Gulf of Mexico that are just waiting to be tapped.¶ On the other hand, Mexican oil exports to the U.S. are declining thanks to the increased U.S. production, and without significant investment in production and infrastructure such as pipelines, it will fail to capitalize on the U.S.-Canada boom.

#### Increased investment in Mexico’s energy sector key to unlocking oil and gas reserves

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John M, “Building a North American Community”, online, CMR

Develop a North American Resource Strategy¶ All three North American countries produce substantial amounts of¶ energy, but the region as a whole is a net importer of energy. Washington’s¶ two neighbors are its biggest suppliers of energy. The production¶ of oil and natural gas on the continent is not keeping up with the¶ growth in demand.¶ Although North American production of oil and gas has been¶ declining, both Canada and Mexico have the potential to develop¶ growing supplies both for their own direct use and for export. These¶ two countries, however, have distinct approaches to the development¶ of energy and other natural resources that must be taken into account¶ in the process of mapping the best path forward for North America.¶ Canada is committed to efficient energy markets, open investment,¶ and free trade in this sector. Canada’s vast oilsands, once a high-cost¶ experimental means of extracting oil, now provide a viable new source¶ of energy that is attracting a steady stream of multibillion dollar investments¶ and interest from countries such as China, and they have catapulted¶ Canada into second place in the world in terms of proved oil¶ reserves. Production from oilsands fields is projected to reach 2 million¶ barrels per day by 2010. The most serious constraints on additional¶ growth are the limited supply of skilled people and the shortage of¶ infrastructure, including housing, transportation links, and pipeline¶ capacity. Another constraint is regulatory approval processes that can¶ slow down both resource and infrastructure development significantly.¶ Mexico is also a major energy supplier and customer within North¶ America. In 2004, it was the second-largest exporter of oil to the United¶ States; in previous years, it was consistently among the top four suppliers.¶ Mexico relies for a significant share of its revenues on the state oil¶ producer (Pemex). It has major oil and gas reserves, but these are¶ relatively untapped. Development has been hampered by constitutional¶ restrictions on ownership, which are driven by an understandable desire¶ to see this strategic asset used for the benefit ofMexicans. This restriction¶ on investment, coupled with the inefficient management of the state¶ monopoly, Pemex, has contributed to low productivity. As a result,¶ Mexico has expensive and unreliable supplies of energy for its consumers¶ and industries. Mexico has begun to bring in some foreign capital¶ through multiple service contracts, but the most serious constraints on¶ its future growth as an energy supplier are the restrictions that impede¶ development of its own energy resources and the low productivity of¶ Pemex. Reforms in this area are needed urgently.¶ Although energy security represents perhaps the most critical challenge,¶ it is important to recognize that trade in other natural resources,¶ including metals, minerals, wood, and other products, is also central¶ to the growth and economic security of North America. In these other¶ resource sectors, NAFTA has not succeeded in ensuring a free flow of¶ goods. Resource and agricultural products such as softwood lumber,¶ fish, beef, wheat, and sugar have been the flashpoints for highly visible¶ trade disputes. The softwood lumber case has led some Canadians to¶ question whether the United States will comply with NAFTA if decisions¶ by the dispute-settlement mechanism run counter to private¶ American interests.TheUnited States andMexico have failed tocomply¶ with free trade provisions on movement of trucks for more than a¶ decade, and the failure to resolve the softwood lumber case between¶ Canada and the United States has plagued their trade relations for¶ the past quarter century. Changing some trade rules and the disputesettlement¶ process may reduce this friction, as would a determined effort¶ to reduce unnecessary regulatory differences within North America.¶ NorthAmerica is blessed with an abundant resource base. Exploiting¶ these resources on a long-term, sustainable basis requires that the three¶ governments work together to resolve issues and ensure responsible¶ use of scarce resources and the free flow of both resources and capital¶ across all three borders. As noted, the most troubled areas of crossborder¶ trade over the past twenty years have been in resource trade,¶ largely because of the impact of regulatory differences, including different¶ approaches to resource pricing and income protection. Efforts to¶ eliminate these problems on the basis of dispute-settlementmechanisms¶ have not worked as well as anticipated.¶ WHAT WE SHOULD DO NOW¶ • Develop a NorthAmerican energy strategy. Recognizing their¶ individual policies and priorities, the three governments need to¶ work together to ensure energy security for people in all three¶ countries. Issues to be addressed include the expansion and protection¶ of theNorthAmerican energy infrastructure; development opportunities¶ and regulatory barriers; and the technological andhuman capital¶ constraints on accelerated development of energy resources within¶ North America. These objectives form part of the agenda of the¶ North American Energy Working Group established in 2001 by¶ the leaders of the three countries and emphasized in their 2005¶ summit meeting. This initiative, however, has so far made only¶ modest progress toward developing a North American strategy, and¶ it does not cover oil.¶ • Fully develop Mexican energy resources. Although the inclination¶ of Mexico to retain full ownership of its strategic resources is¶ understandable, expanded and more efficient development of these¶ resources is needed to accelerate Mexico’s economic growth. Mexico¶ is quickly losing ground in its energy independence, and the only¶ way to satisfy growing demands within Mexico is to find ways to¶ unlock its energy sector. Progress can be made even under the¶ existing constitutional constraints. As discussed above, Canada and¶ the United States could make important contributions in this effort¶ through the development of creative mechanisms, especially financial,¶ that bring needed technology and capital to Mexico. The most¶ important steps, however, must be taken in Mexico by Mexicans.

#### Independently, the plan encourages internal reform in Mexico’s energy sector

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Robert A, “The Solution to North America’s Triple Problem: The Case for a North American Investment Fund”, Year 2, No. 2, January, <http://www.american.edu/sis/cnas/upload/triple_problem_pastor.pdf>, CMR

(5) A Community and Conditionality. Of the $20 billion each year for the North ¶ American Investment Fund, Canada and the United States should pay half, with the ¶ U.S.—with about nine times the economy of Canada—accounting for 90 percent of that. ¶ Mexico should contribute the other $10 billion. The United States and Canada are ¶ unlikely to contribute funds unless both countries felt that it would be used wisely and ¶ that Mexico would undertake serious long-term reforms. Mexico understands that it ¶ needs to undertake fundamental reforms in sensitive sectors such as energy, taxes, ¶ pensions, electricity, and the judicial system but the political system has been stalemated. ¶ If its partners were to define, together, a community of three nations that would ¶ contribute to that future, then that might alter the political balance in a way that would ¶ make both the reforms and the Fund possible. Absent those changes, the U.S. and ¶ Canada might very well conclude that their funds would not be put to good use and ¶ would not want to contribute. Spain and Ireland understood the need for reforms but they ¶ could only implement them with the support of the EU.

#### This framework will shield the US from vulnerability of foreign sources

Gjelten 12 (Tom, “Energy Independence For U.S.? Try Energy Security”, 10/25, <http://www.npr.org/2012/10/25/163573768/energy-independence-for-u-s-try-energy-security>, CMR)

Gone from this year's presidential campaign are most mentions of climate change, environmental pollution, or green jobs. Former Gov. Mitt Romney, the GOP presidential nominee, prefers to call attention instead to the country's continuing dependence on foreign energy sources.¶ "I will set a national goal of North American energy independence by the year 2020," Romney declared in August.¶ The line is now a standard part of Romney's stump speech, and he repeated it in his first two debates with President Obama.¶ With that promise, Romney joins a long line of U.S. leaders who have preached the virtues of energy independence. Few, however, have explained precisely what this goal means.¶ A Global Market¶ In truth, it would be virtually impossible for any country to be totally independent where energy is concerned. Not only would it have to produce all its own oil; it would also have to be independent of the global economy.¶ Energy¶ Could U.S. Produce Enough Oil To Rival Saudi Arabia?¶ Like sugar, wheat, gold and other commodities, oil is also bought and sold on a global market. All the oil produced in the world becomes part of the global oil supply; all the oil used comes out of that supply. The global oil price depends on the supply/demand relation, and the price is essentially the same for all countries.¶ Energy analyst Amy Jaffe likens players in the global oil market to swimmers in a swimming pool.¶ "If you're in the deep end or the shallow end and somebody takes water out of the pool, it affects both swimmers equally," Jaffe says. "[It's the] same thing if we start pouring water in. You're not pouring the water into just the deep end or just the shallow end."¶ With oil, all countries are affected when the total supply is down relative to demand; the price goes up. When the supply is boosted and there is plenty of oil for everyone, the global price goes down.¶ With respect to price, therefore, there is no such thing as energy independence. Even if the U.S. were producing as much oil as it was consuming, a halt in production by Iran or Saudi Arabia would still drive up the oil price in the U.S.¶ Energy Security¶ But there is another way to think about energy independence. If a country produces as much oil as it uses, it is less vulnerable to some foreign country shutting the tap. Jaffe, executive director of energy and sustainability at the University of California, Davis, says this is the big reason governments want to reduce their dependence on foreign oil producers.¶ "If someone is going to cut off your supply, because they don't like your foreign policy or they want to keep you from attacking a country, this is a dangerous thing," Jaffe says.¶ But is "energy independence" the proper term to describe the national goal?¶ "I prefer the term 'energy security,' " says Roger Altman, who served as deputy Treasury secretary under President Clinton.¶ "What that means," Altman says, "is, 'Let's get to the point where the amount we import from rogue or potentially rogue nations who might be hostile to us is down to a point where, if suddenly that supply was interrupted or shut off, we go right on.' "¶ The U.S. learned the importance of "energy security" in 1973, when Arab countries imposed an oil boycott on the United States to protest its military support for Israel in its war against Egypt and Syria. Americans were soon waiting in long lines at gas stations.¶ In response to the Arab oil boycott, President Nixon set a new national goal in his 1974 State of the Union speech.¶ "At the end of this decade, in the year 1980," Nixon proposed, "the United States will not be dependent on any other country for the energy we need to provide our jobs, to heat our homes and to keep our transportation moving."¶ A Glimmer Of Hope¶ The fact that we are still talking about this goal nearly 40 years later shows how hard it is to achieve. But there is reason now to believe that energy security may finally be within reach. Energy production in the U.S. is booming, thanks in large part to new techniques for extracting oil and gas from hard-to-reach deposits.¶ According to the latest estimates from the U.S. government's Energy Information Administration, U.S. production of oil and other liquid petroleum products could soon overtake production from Saudi Arabia, the world's No. 1 oil producer. Oil imports, meanwhile, are declining.¶ U.S. energy demand remains high, however, and it is likely to be years before the United States has an energy supply entirely its own.¶ Even in that case, however, the U.S. could significantly boost its energy security, because new production throughout the Western Hemisphere would leave the country less vulnerable to a shutoff from the Middle East or elsewhere.¶ "It doesn't mean we would never import another barrel of oil outside the Western Hemisphere," says Altman, who is now the chairman of Evercore Partners, an investment banking firm. "What it means is that most of our oil imports would come from Canada, Mexico, Brazil and so forth, and whatever happened in the Middle East would have no severe downside for our economic stability."¶ This is progress. It's hard to imagine how a conflict with Brazil or Mexico, much less with Canada, could jeopardize the U.S. energy supply.

#### Dependence causes multiple war scenarios

Glaser 11 (Professor of Political Science and International Relations Elliot School of International Affairs The George Washington University, “Reframing Energy Security: How Oil Dependence Influences U.S. National Security,” August 2011, http://depts.washington.edu/polsadvc/Blog%20Links/Glaser\_-\_EnergySecurity-AUGUST-2011.docx)

**Oil dependence** could reduce a state’s security if its access to oil is vulnerable to disruption and if oil is necessary for operating the state’s military forces. Vulnerable energy supplies can leave a state open to coercion**—recognizing that it is more likely to lose a war, the state has a** weaker bargaining position **and is** more likely to make concessions.[[1]](#endnote-1) Closely related, **if war occurs the state is** more likely to lose. Conflict that is influenced by this mechanism is not fundamentally over the oil;[[2]](#endnote-2) rather, when states already have incentives for conflict, the oil vulnerability influences their assessment of military capabilities and in turn the path to war. Recognizing this type of danger during the Cold War, U.S. planning to protect its sea lanes of communication with the Persian Gulf was motivated partly by the importance of insuring the steady flow of oil that was necessary to enable the United States to fight a long war against the Soviet Union in Europe. During the Second World War, Japan’s vulnerability to a U.S. oil embargo played an important role in destroying Japan’s ability to fight.[[3]](#endnote-3) This type of threat to the U.S. military capabilities is not a serious danger today because the United States does not face a major power capable of severely interrupting its access to key supplies of oil. In contrast, China does face this type of danger because its oil imports are vulnerable to disruption by the U.S. Navy. Protecting access to oil threatens other states—an access-driven security dilemma **The vulnerability of** a state’s **access to oil** supplies **could reduce** its **security via** a second, more complicated mechanism—if the state’s efforts to protect its access to oil threaten another state’s security, then this reduced security could in turn reduce the state’s own security. The danger would follow standard **security-dilemma logic,** but with the defense of oil supply lines replacing the standard focus on protection of territory. In the most extreme case, **a state could try to solve its import vulnerability through** territorial expansion. In less extreme cases, **the state could deal with its vulnerability by building up military forces required to protect its access to oil, which has the unintended consequence of** decreasing its adversary’s military capability and signaling that the state’s motives are malign, **which** decreases the adversary’s security, which **leads to the adversary** building up its own military forces.[[4]](#endnote-4) Just as protecting a distant ally can require a state to adopt an offensive capability, protecting access to oil can require offensive power-projection capabilities. Thus, a state’s need to protect its access to oil could create a security dilemma that would not otherwise exist. Conflict fueled by **this security dilemma** need not be over oil or access to oil; by damaging political relations the security dilemma **could prevent** the **states from** resolving political disputes **and** avoiding the escalation of crises. Here again, the United States does not currently face this type of danger; this is largely because the military status quo currently favors the United States, which relieves it from having to take provocative actions. In contrast, China’s efforts to protect its access to oil could be more provocative and generate military competition with the United States. Oil makes territory increasingly valuable In this type of case, **a states place greater value on owning territory because the territory contains energy resources** that are increasingly valuable. **The greater value** of territory **which can** increase competition between states, **because the benefits of success grow relative** to the costs of competition, for example, the costs of arming. For similar reasons, the greater value of territory increases the probability that crises over territory will lead to war instead of negotiated compromises, as states are more willing to run the risks of fighting.[[5]](#endnote-5) This type of conflict is the classic resource war, which is the path by which oil is most commonly envisioned leading to conflict.[[6]](#endnote-6) We can also hypothesize that the probability of conflict is greater when territorial boundaries are contested and the political status quo is ambiguous. Because the norm of state sovereignty is now widely held, states are less likely to launch expansionist wars to take other states’ territory. However, when boundaries are not settled, states are more likely to compete to acquire territory they value and will compete harder when they value it more.[[7]](#endnote-7) In addition, unsettled boundaries increase the possibilities for boundedly rational bargaining failures that could lead to war. There are two basic paths via which a state could become involved in this type of oil conflict. The more obvious is for the state to be a claimant in the dispute and become directly involved in a territorial conflict. The second is likely more important for the United States—an alliance commitment could draw the state into a resource conflict that initially began between its ally and another state.[[8]](#endnote-8) The state would not have energy interests of its own at stake, but intervenes to protect its ally. Along this path, energy plays an important but less direct role in damaging the state’s security, because although energy interests fuel the initial conflict, they do not motivate the state’s intervention.[[9]](#endnote-9) A later section explores the possibility of conflict between China and Japan in the East China Sea, with the United States drawn in to protect Japan and consequently involved in a war with China. **When a state’s economy depends heavily on oil, severe supply disruptions might do sufficiently large economic damage that** the state would use military force to protect its prosperity. **A state** this suffers this vulnerability risks not only suffering the damage that could be inflicted by a supply disruption, which might be the by-product of unrelated domestic or international events, but also risks being coerced by an adversary. Consequently, states will want to be confident that their ability to import oil will be uninterrupted and will pursue policies to ensure secure access.

#### Specifically, oil dependence makes conflict over the Strait of Hormuz inevitable – that *escalates* and *goes nuclear*

Glaser 11 (Professor of Political Science and International Relations Elliot School of International Affairs The George Washington University, “Reframing Energy Security: How Oil Dependence Influences U.S. National Security,” August 2011, http://depts.washington.edu/polsadvc/Blog%20Links/Glaser\_-\_EnergySecurity-AUGUST-2011.docx)

Energy dependence could draw the United States into a conflict in which a regional power was interrupting, or threatening to interrupt, the flow of oil. The economic costs of a disruption would determine whether the costs of fighting were justified. Similarly, the potential economic costs of a disruption would determine whether U.S. foreign and military policy should be devoted to deterring states from interrupting the flow of oil; more precisely, these economic costs would determine how much the United States should invest in the policies required for deterrence.[[10]](#endnote-10) Given the geographical distribution of oil, such a conflict would likely occur in the Persian Gulf. The greatest danger is probably posed by Iran—the Iraq War has greatly increased Iran’s power relative to Iraq, and Iran is acquiring improved missile capabilities and making progress toward having the capability to build nuclear weapons. The most disruptive Iranian action would be closure of the Strait of Hormuz, through which the vast majority of Persian Gulf oil must pass. Having identified the danger posed by dependence on oil that transits this strait (as well as the Strait of Malacca), a recent Council on Foreign Relations study concluded that the “United States should take the lead in building an infrastructure protection program that would be based on practical steps by relevant countries and address critical infrastructures and transit routes. Initial efforts should focus on joint planning, technical assistance, and military exercises, especially involving naval units operating near ports or along critical sea-lanes.”[[11]](#endnote-11) Although difficult to estimate the probability that Iran would attempt to close the strait, analysts have offered reasons for expecting the probability to be quite low: Iran would lose the oil revenue from its own exports; and Iran would likely be deterred by the probable costs of U.S. intervention, which could include the destruction of key military bases and occupation of some of its territory. Because so much oil flows through the strait of Hormuz, the United States would almost certainly respond to keep it open. Nevertheless, there are plausible scenarios in which Iran blocks the strait, for example, as retaliation for an attack against is nuclear weapons program or as a coercive measure if losing a conventional war.[[12]](#endnote-12) Careful analysis suggests that the United States would prevail, but that a successful campaign could take many weeks or more, and that oil prices would increase significantly during this period.[[13]](#endnote-13) Iranian acquisition of nuclear weapons would increase the risk of this scenario in two basic ways. First, Iran might believe that the possibility of escalation to nuclear weapons would deter the United States from responding, making Iran more willing to interrupt tanker traffic. Although basic deterrence logic says this calculation points in the correct direction, the United States might nevertheless intervene. The United States would question Iran’s willingness to escalate to nuclear use because America’s far larger and more capable nuclear forces would pose a formidable retaliatory threat. In addition, the United States would have incentives to make clear that possession of a small number of nuclear weapons by a much weaker state would not deter the United States from using conventional weapons in a limited war. Being deterred by the Iranian nuclear force would suggest that small nuclear arsenals provide tremendous potential for launching conventional aggression. As Barry Posen argued in a related context (the counterfactual case in which Iraq possessed nuclear weapons before deciding to invade Kuwait), “If the Iraqi conquest of Kuwait is permitted to stand, nuclear weapons will come to be viewed as a shield that protects conventional conquests from any challenger, including a great power heavily armed with its own nuclear weapons.”[[14]](#endnote-14) Consequently, the United States would have incentives to respond to Iranian aggression both to preserve its ability to deter conventional aggression by small nuclear states and to support its nonproliferation policy. Second, once a conventional conflict occurred, there would be the danger that U.S. conventional operations could increase the probability [of] nuclear war. A number of paths are possible. The U.S. mine clearing operation required to open the strait would likely be accompanied by attacks against land-based Iranian targets. The United States would want to destroy the land-based anti-ship cruise missiles that Iran could use to threaten U.S. mine clearing ships; in addition, the United States would want to destroy Iranian air defenses that could be used to protect these missiles. These U.S. strikes would require large numbers of carrier-based aircraft flying sorties over a period of a few weeks or more.[[15]](#endnote-15) If Iran lacked confidence that U.S. aims were limited, it could feel compelled to put its nuclear forces on alert to increase their survivability, which would increase the probability of accidental or unauthorized nuclear attack. The United States could then have incentives to attack Iran’s nuclear force, either preemptively because it believed Iran was preparing to launch an attack or preventively because it faced a closing window of opportunity after which Iran’s nuclear forces would be survivable.[[16]](#endnote-16) A more subtle danger is the possibility of inadvertent nuclear escalation resulting from a situation in which Iranian leaders decide to escalate because they believe, incorrectly, that the United States has decided to destroy their nuclear force (or ability to launch it).[[17]](#endnote-17) U.S. conventional operations could create this danger by destroying Iranian radars, and command and control systems, leaving Iranian leaders unable to assess the U.S. conventional campaign and fearing that the United States was preparing to launch a full-scale invasion or a conventional attack against their nuclear forces.

### Advantage 3: Illegal Immigration

#### Despite recent policy changes, illegal immigration is increasing – arrest rates prove

Dinan ’13 (Stephen, “Arrest numbers signal 9 percent jump in illegal immigration in 2012”, 1/29, <http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/jan/29/arrests-signal-9-percent-jump-illegal-immigration/?page=all>, CMR)

Even as President Obama travels to Las Vegas Tuesday to call for legalizing illegal immigrants, the latest numbers from the U.S. Border Patrol suggest that the flow across the nation’s southwest border jumped by 9 percent last year.¶ The Border Patrol made 356,873 arrests along the U.S.-Mexico border in fiscal year 2012, up from 327,577 in 2011, according to figures obtained by the Associated Press and confirmed by The Washington Times. Border Patrol officials estimate that apprehensions are a good proxy for illegal crossings, so when the numbers go up, it means that the flow of illegal immigrants is going up as well.¶ Last year’s increase marks a reversal. Apprehensions peaked in 2005 at 1.2 million and had been steadily dropping every year since as first President George W. Bush and then Mr. Obama committed more manpower and resources to the border.¶ In his first term Mr. Obama said he had fortified the border so much that it could now be deemed secure, and Congress could turn its attention to passing an overhaul of the broader immigration system.¶ On the way to Las Vegas, White House press secretary Jay Carney told reporters Tuesday that the apprehension numbers are a good sign.¶ “We’ve seen in Fiscal Year 2012 apprehensions totaled nearly 365,000 nationwide; that’s a 50 percent decrease from 2008,” he said.¶ The Homeland Security Department didn’t respond Tuesday morning to a request for comment on the new numbers, but Jessica Vaughan, director of policy studies for the Center for Immigration Studies, said the data represents a problem for Mr. Obama as he pushes for legalization.¶ “The Obama administration has asked the public and policy makers to accept its theory that declining numbers have meant that we are actually getting control of the border and that it is ‘more secure than ever before.’ If they’re going to stick with that logic, this would meant that things are going in the other direction,” she said.¶ She said the new numbers should push lawmakers to put the brakes on immigration and wait to see what’s behind the increase: whether it’s Latin American economies pushing more people to flee, or the U.S. economy improving enough to draw in new immigrant workers, or failures in American border security efforts.¶ Mr. Obama is expected to use his Las Vegas speech to embrace much of the bipartisan framework announced Monday by eight senators that would grant immediate legal status to all illegal immigrants, but withhold green cards until the border is secured. Green cards, signifying legal permanent residency, are the key interim step before getting citizenship.¶ Politico reported Tuesday that Mr. Obama will agree with most of the framework, but will balk at waiting for border security to be guaranteed before issuing green cards.¶ Border security has been among the thorniest issues of the immigration debate.¶ In 2007, the Senate’s last effort to pass a legalization bill failed after voters flooded the Capitol switchboard with calls insisting that Congress first work to secure the borders.¶ President Bush and Congress boosted manpower and technology on the border, and the number of apprehensions — and, presumably, illegal crossings — dropped dramatically.¶ In fiscal year 2005 the Border Patrol made 1,1717,396 arrests along the southwest border; it made 1,071,972 arrests in 2006; 858,638 arrests in 2007; 705,005 arrests in 2008; 540,865 in 2009; 447,731 in 2010; and 327,577 in 2011.¶ A Government Accountability Office report earlier this month detailed some of the Border Patrol’s internal calculations about how many illegal crossers it misses, and the report said about 40 percent of would-be illegal immigrants get away. That rate has held consistent over time.¶ But Glenn Spencer, head of American Border Patrol, a private citizens group that tracks border crossings, said according to their own estimates, the Border Patrol only catches about 30 percent of illegal crossers.¶ If true, that would mean more than 800,000 illegal immigrants crossed without being apprehended last year.

#### Tide of illegal immigration makes terrorism inevitable

Ting 6 [OTMS refers to non-Mexican immigrants; Jan, professor of law at Temple University's Beasley School of Law and an FPRI senior fellow, Immigration and National Security, Orbis 50.1 p 41-52, CMR]

This summer’s terror bombings in London have brought new attention to the Islamist threat. They also highlight the striking difference between U.S. and European views over the Islamist threat. In Europe, the greatest concern is the threat from its own resident immigrant population, particularly the young second and third generations, born in Europe. In the U.S., the greatest concern is not its own population, but the threat of those sent from abroad to attack America.¶ With acts of violence from Muslim citizens in Europe increasing in number and scale, many Europeans feel that the Islamist threat needs to be addressed at home, not in Iraq. But four years after 9/11, America’s national borders remain open and uncontrolled, even as the government spends billions of dollars and thousands of lives in Iraq and Afghanistan fighting terrorism, and even as it worries about protecting the nation’s ports, power supply, mass transit, and every other possible target against terrorist threats.¶ Illegal Immigration¶ Every night, thousands of foreigners covertly enter the U.S. The official estimate is that the U.S. Border Patrol intercepts only 1 out of every 4 illegal border crossers. But current and former Border Patrol officers say that the ratio of those intercepted is much lower-probably more like 1:8 or 1:10. And because of the illegals’ remittances of U.S. dollars back to their home country, Mexico in particular has been supportive of its citizens who choose to enter the U.S. illegally.¶ Data on Border Patrol apprehensions for fiscal years 2000-05 show that apprehensions were highest in 2000, over 1.5 million, and then declined over the next three years, following 9/11. They rose again in 2004 and 2005, after President Bush announced his proposal for guest-worker amnesty in January 2004. Apprehensions along the southern border make up about 98 percent of total apprehensions. Most of those apprehended near the U.S.’s southern border are Mexicans, but there are also numerous “other than Mexicans,” or OTMs.¶ Research by Wayne Cornelius of the Center for Comparative Immigration Studies at the University of California, San Diego suggests that 92 percent of Mexicans seeking to enter the U.S. illegally eventually succeed. Meanwhile, the number of OTMs apprehended near the southern border has been clearly and dramatically increasing since 2000, from 28,598 that year to 65,814 in 2004 and 100,142 OTM in the first eight months of fiscal 2005 alone.¶ What happens following apprehension is very different for OTMs than for Mexicans, who can be immediately returned to Mexico in what is described as voluntary departure. (In the case of adult Mexicans, U.S. authorities simply take them back to the border.) In contrast, the Mexican government does not allow the U.S. to send OTMs back into Mexico. That may be understandable, but since these OTMs clearly entered the U.S. through Mexico, Washington might usefully and legitimately put some diplomatic pressure on Mexico City either to take the OTMs back or to prevent their entry into the U.S. in the first place.¶ An OTM has to be scheduled for a hearing with an immigration judge, who can issue a removal order. A scheduled immigration hearing may be weeks later, and even if a removal order is issued, the alien has the right to appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals and then the federal courts. The government therefore has a dilemma. It can either detain the alien until the hearing (and, if a removal order is issued, until all appeal rights are exhausted), or it can release the alien on his “own recognizance,” and hope that the alien will voluntarily appear for the scheduled hearing and, if ordered removed and after exhausting all appeals, voluntarily appear for deportation.¶ Because the government has only authorized and funded a small number of detention spaces (a total of 19,444 in 2004, with another 1,950 added in May 2005), increasing numbers of OTMs are released on their own recognizance. Fewer than 6,000 OTMs were released on their own recognizance in each of 2001 and 2002, but the number increased to 7,972 in 2003 and jumped to 34,161 in 2004; 70,624 were released in just the first 8 months of fiscal 2005.¶ The failure-to-appear rate at one Texas immigration court is 98 percent. A removal order is typically issued in absentia for those who fail to appear. When the statutory appeal rights all expire, the names are added to the list of alien “absconders” who have actually been caught by the government, ordered removed by an immigration judge, exhausted all their appeal rights, but are still in the country anyway. The list of such absconders is now 465,000 and growing, out of a total illegal alien population of 8 to 12 million, per a December 2003 estimate by Tom Ridge, then Secretary of Homeland Security. Lou Dobbs of CNN, among others, uses 20 million as a more realistic number.¶ The release rate for apprehended OTMs is now so high, Border Patrol agents report that instead of hiding from the authorities, illegally entering OTMs actually seek them out in order to obtain the document charging them with illegal entry. They call this “Notice to Appear,” which informs them of the date and place of their scheduled hearing before an immigration judge, a permiso; some agents call it a “Notice to Disappear,” since that is what it permits them to do. If they are challenged while moving deeper into the U.S. from the border, they can produce the document to show that they have already scheduled an appointment before immigration judges.¶ The overwhelming majority of the millions of illegals, and even of the absconders, are not terrorists. But the sea of incoming illegal aliens provides a cover and a culture in which terrorists can hide, and a reliable means of entry. And as we know from the case of the 2004 Madrid train bombings, many Islamist terrorists are fluent in Spanish. Border Patrol apprehension figures show that among the OTMs apprehended in 2004 and 2005 were hundreds of persons from 35 “special interest” countries, almost all of which are Muslim. These countries include Afghanistan, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen; the number-one country in the group is Pakistan. Again, these are just the apprehensions: for every alien apprehended entering the U.S. illegally, an estimated 3 to 9 others succeed.

#### Terrorism is likely – failure to secure borders means terrorists will smuggle nuclear weapons into the US

Joyner 9 [Christopher C: Professor of Government and Foreign Service at Georgetown, June 22nd, “Article: Nuclear terrorism in a globalizing world: assessing the threat and the emerging management regime,” <http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-216486733.html>, CMR]

A. The Cause for Concern¶ During the last decade, the determination of al-Qaeda to acquire nuclear weapons, the information and communication powers afforded to them by globalization, and the existence of fissile nuclear materials in unstable regions have all has contributed to the transformation of the threat of nuclear terrorism from a hypothetical scenario into a policy issue of grave concern. (27) In its examination of the terrorist threats facing the United States after the events of September 11, 2001, the 9/11 Commission averred that, "preventing terrorists from gaining access to weapons of mass destruction must be elevated above all other problems of national security ... [the President] should develop a comprehensive plan to dramatically accelerate the timetable for securing all nuclear weapons material around the world." (28) This report was based on the discovery of documents by the United States describing the extent of al-Qaeda's nuclear ambitions. In 1998, Osama bin Laden declared that the acquisition of nuclear weapons was a "religious duty." (29) Since this time, reports indicate that al-Qaeda has made numerous attempts to purchase nuclear weapons on the black market, but these efforts have been thwarted by supposed sellers scamming al-Qaeda. (30) Indeed, the CIA's Bin Laden Unit has documented what it describes as a "professional" attempt to acquire nuclear weapons by al-Qaeda, which prompted the conclusion that "there could be no doubt after this date [late 1996] that al-Qaeda was in deadly earnest in seeking nuclear weapons. (31) This particular attempt even involved meetings with Pakistani nuclear scientists, as well as calls for other scientists with nuclear expertise to join the fight against the United States. In spite of the disruption of al-Qaeda's network since the War on Terror began in 2001, U.S. officials continue to warn that its members retain the ability to launch terrorist nuclear attacks coordinated from its new bases in Pakistan. (32) As such, the desire of al-Qaeda to conduct massive nuclear attacks against the United States is one of the principal factors that has made nuclear terrorism a real threat in the 21st century.¶ The danger that al-Qaeda's nuclear ambitions pose to the United States is compounded by the manner in which the processes of globalization have impacted the world. These impacts have not only empowered other purveyors of jihadist violence, but they also have simplified the means by which such terrorists can smuggle and deliver nuclear weapons to their intended targets. Notwithstanding the debate over the pros and cons of globalization, it is widely accepted that, "[t]he technological revolution presupposes global computerized networks and the free movement of goods, information, and peoples across national boundaries." (33) In the same ways that these occurrences facilitate more efficient functioning of daily life in many states, globalization concomitantly creates more and speedier networks through which international terrorist organizations can perpetrate violent attacks. (34)¶ Technological innovations such as the internet and telecommunication networks that have accompanied globalization allow terrorists to communicate with one another across the globe, and thus contribute to the ease with which they can orchestrate and execute complex missions. (35) With respect to nuclear terrorism, terrorists can now discover the location of fissile materials and plan attacks on nuclear facilities with much greater ease. Meanwhile, they are also able to utilize tools like the internet to disseminate and access information concerning the construction of nuclear devices. (36) As such, , allow terrorist groups like AI-Qaeda to transform themselves into powerful non-state actors with specialized technological knowledge that can subvert the goals of powerful states. (37)¶ Moreover, and enable terrorist groups to transport nuclear weapons more stealthily from their places of origin to intended targets. As a result of globalization and commercial liberalization, massive amounts of international trade and commerce occur everyday. Given the sheer volume of goods entering all states, the chance of detecting illicit commodities is lower. (38) In the case of the United States, as of late 2008 there were 317 entry points into the country, which makes the volume of goods entering the United States that much more difficult to detect and thoroughly examine. (39) This is significant because, with respect to nuclear materials, only small amounts of easily concealable fissile material are needed to create dangerous devices. Accordingly, physical detection is made more difficult and smuggling nuclear material in large containers becomes more practicable. (40) Electronic detection instruments, while in development and being tested in limited cases, have not yet been fully deployed. (41) Meanwhile, large amounts of illegal drugs and immigrants enter even the most highly industrialized countries like the United States every year, testifying to the ease with which groups could simply smuggle nuclear materials across porous state borders. (42)These developments render the threat of nuclear terrorism a far more serious policy issue than previously acknowledged, as they afford terrorist organizations greater power and easier means to accomplish their nuclear ambitions to destroy western societies. (43) Meanwhile, globalization means that "new threats cannot be contained and controlled within one State" and will consequently require international solutions. (44)

#### That causes great power nuclear war

Ayson 10, Professor of Strategic Studies and Director of the Centre for Strategic Studies: New Zealand at the Victoria University of Wellington, 2010 (Robert, “After a Terrorist Nuclear Attack: Envisaging Catalytic Effects,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Volume 33, Issue 7, July, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via InformaWorld)

A terrorist nuclear attack, and even the use of nuclear weapons in response by the country attacked in the first place, would not necessarily represent the worst of the nuclear worlds imaginable. Indeed, there are reasons to wonder whether nuclear terrorism should ever be regarded as belonging in the category of truly existential threats. A contrast can be drawn here with the global catastrophe that would come from a massive nuclear exchange between two or more of the sovereign states that possess these weapons in significant numbers. Even the worst terrorism that the twenty-first century might bring would fade into insignificance alongside considerations of what a general nuclear war would have wrought in the Cold War period. And it must be admitted that as long as the major nuclear weapons states have hundreds and even thousands of nuclear weapons at their disposal, there is always the possibility of a truly awful nuclear exchange taking place precipitated entirely by state possessors themselves. But these two nuclear worlds—a non-state actor nuclear attack and a catastrophic interstate nuclear exchange—are not necessarily separable. It is just possible that some sort of terrorist attack, and especially an act of nuclear terrorism, could precipitate a chain of events leading to a massive exchange of nuclear weapons between two or more of the states that possess them. In this context, today’s and tomorrow’s terrorist groups might assume the place allotted during the early Cold War years to new state possessors of small nuclear arsenals who were seen as raising the risks of a catalytic nuclear war between the superpowers started by third parties. These risks were considered in the late 1950s and early 1960s as concerns grew about nuclear proliferation, the so-called n+1 problem. It may require a considerable amount of imagination to depict an especially plausible situation where an act of nuclear terrorism could lead to such a massive inter-state nuclear war. For example, in the event of a terrorist nuclear attack on the United States, it might well be wondered just how Russia and/or China could plausibly be brought into the picture, not least because they seem unlikely to be fingered as the most obvious state sponsors or encouragers of terrorist groups. They would seem far too responsible to be involved in supporting that sort of terrorist behavior that could just as easily threaten them as well. Some possibilities, however remote, do suggest themselves. For example, how might the United States react if it was thought or discovered that the fissile material used in the act of nuclear terrorism had come from Russian stocks,40 and if for some reason Moscow denied any responsibility for nuclear laxity? The correct attribution of that nuclear material to a particular country might not be a case of science fiction given the observation by Michael May et al. that while the debris resulting from a nuclear explosion would be “spread over a wide area in tiny fragments, its radioactivity makes it detectable, identifiable and collectable, and a wealth of information can be obtained from its analysis: the efficiency of the explosion, the materials used and, most important … some indication of where the nuclear material came from.”41 Alternatively, if the act of nuclear terrorism came as a complete surprise, and American officials refused to believe that a terrorist group was fully responsible (or responsible at all) suspicion would shift immediately to state possessors. Ruling out Western ally countries like the United Kingdom and France, and probably Israel and India as well, authorities in Washington would be left with a very short list consisting of North Korea, perhaps Iran if its program continues, and possibly Pakistan. But at what stage would Russia and China be definitely ruled out in this high stakes game of nuclear Cluedo? In particular, if the act of nuclear terrorism occurred against a backdrop of existing tension in Washington’s relations with Russia and China, and at a time when threats had already been traded between these major powers, would officials and political leaders not be tempted to assume the worst? Of course, the chances of this occurring would only seem to increase if the United States was already involved in some sort of limited armed conflict with Russia and/or China, or if they were confronting each other from a distance in a proxy war, as unlikely as these developments may seem at the present time. The reverse might well apply too: should a nuclear terrorist attack occur in Russia or China during a period of heightened tension or even limited conflict with the United States, could Moscow and Beijing resist the pressures that might rise domestically to consider the United States as a possible perpetrator or encourager of the attack? Washington’s early response to a terrorist nuclear attack on its own soil might also raise the possibility of an unwanted (and nuclear aided) confrontation with Russia and/or China. For example, in the noise and confusion during the immediate aftermath of the terrorist nuclear attack, the U.S. president might be expected to will place the country’s armed forces, including its nuclear arsenal, on a higher stage of alert. In such a tense environment, when careful planning runs up against the friction of reality, it is just possible that Moscow and/or China might mistakenly read this as a sign of U.S. intentions to use force (and possibly nuclear force) against them. In that situation, the temptations to preempt such actions might grow, although it must be admitted that any preemption would probably still meet with a devastating response. As part of its initial response to the act of nuclear terrorism (as discussed earlier) Washington might decide to order a significant conventional (or nuclear) retaliatory or disarming attack against the leadership of the terrorist group and/or states seen to support that group. Depending on the identity and especially the location of these targets, Russia and/or China might interpret such action as being far too close for their comfort, and potentially as an infringement on their spheres of influence and even on their sovereignty. One far-fetched but perhaps not impossible scenario might stem from a judgment in Washington that some of the main aiders and abetters of the terrorist action resided somewhere such as Chechnya, perhaps in connection with what Allison claims is the “Chechen insurgents’ … long-standing interest in all things nuclear.”42 American pressure on that part of the world would almost certainly raise alarms in Moscow that might require a degree of advanced consultation from Washington that the latter found itself unable or unwilling to provide. There is also the question of how other nuclear-armed states respond to the act of nuclear terrorism on another member of that special club. It could reasonably be expected that following a nuclear terrorist attack on the United States, both Russia and China would extend immediate sympathy and support to Washington and would work alongside the United States in the Security Council. But there is just a chance, albeit a slim one, where the support of Russia and/or China is less automatic in some cases than in others. For example, what would happen if the United States wished to discuss its right to retaliate against groups based in their territory? If, for some reason, Washington found the responses of Russia and China deeply underwhelming, (neither “for us or against us”) might it also suspect that they secretly were in cahoots with the group, increasing (again perhaps ever so slightly) the chances of a major exchange. If the terrorist group had some connections to groups in Russia and China, or existed in areas of the world over which Russia and China held sway, and if Washington felt that Moscow or Beijing were placing a curiously modest level of pressure on them, what conclusions might it then draw about their culpability? If Washington decided to use, or decided to threaten the use of, nuclear weapons, the responses of Russia and China would be crucial to the chances of avoiding a more serious nuclear exchange. They might surmise, for example, that while the act of nuclear terrorism was especially heinous and demanded a strong response, the response simply had to remain below the nuclear threshold. It would be one thing for a non-state actor to have broken the nuclear use taboo, but an entirely different thing for a state actor, and indeed the leading state in the international system, to do so. If Russia and China felt sufficiently strongly about that prospect, there is then the question of what options would lie open to them to dissuade the United States from such action: and as has been seen over the last several decades, the central dissuader of the use of nuclear weapons by states has been the threat of nuclear retaliation

#### Illegal immigration causes an increase in food-borne diseases

FAIR 9 [Federation for American Immigration Reform, most recent date cited, Illegal Immigration and Public Health, <http://www.fairus.org/issue/illegal-immigration-and-public-health>, CMR]

The impact of immigration on our public health is often overlooked. Although millions of visitors for tourism and business come every year, the foreign population of special concern is illegal residents, who come most often from countries with endemic health problems and less developed health care. They are of greatest consequence because they are responsible for a disproportionate share of serious public health problems, are living among us for extended periods of time, and often are dependent on U.S. health care services.¶ Public Health Risks¶ Because illegal immigrants, unlike those who are legally admitted for permanent residence, undergo no medical screening to assure that they are not bearing contagious diseases, the rapidly swelling population of illegal aliens in our country has also set off a resurgence of contagious diseases that had been totally or nearly eradicated by our public health system.¶ According to Dr. Laurence Nickey, director of the El Paso heath district “Contagious diseases that are generally considered to have been controlled in the United States are readily evident along the border ... The incidence of tuberculosis in El Paso County is twice that of the U.S. rate. Dr. Nickey also states that leprosy, which is considered by most Americans to be a disease of the Third World, is readily evident along the U.S.-Mexico border and that dysentery is several times the U.S. rate ... People have come to the border for economic opportunities, but the necessary sewage treatment facilities, public water systems, environmental enforcement, and medical care have not been made available to them, causing a severe risk to health and well being of people on both sides of the border.”1¶ A June, 2009 article in the New England Journal of Medicine noted that a majority (57.8%) of all new cases of tuberculosis in the United States in 2007 were diagnosed in foreign-born persons. The TB infection rate among foreign-born persons was 9.8 times as high as that among U.S.-born persons.2 The article documents the medical testing process for TB required of immigrants and refugees, and this points to foreigners who are unscreened, especially the illegal alien population as the logical source of this disproportionate rate of TB incidence. It should also be kept in mind that among U.S. citizens who contract TB their exposure to the disease may well have come from exposure to a non-U.S. citizen.¶ “The pork tapeworm, which thrives in Latin America and Mexico, is showing up along the U.S. border, threatening to ravage victims with symptoms ranging from seizures to death. ... The same [Mexican] underclass has migrated north to find jobs on the border, bringing the parasite and the sickness—cysticercosis—its eggs can cause[.] Cysts that form around the larvae usually lodge in the brain and destroy tissue, causing hallucinations, speech and vision problems, severe headaches, strokes, epileptic seizures, and in rare cases death.”3¶ The problem, however, is not confined to the border region, as illegal immigrants have rapidly spread across the country into many new economic sectors such as food processing, construction, and hospitality services.

#### Disease spread will cause extinction

Steinbruner 98 [John D., Senior Fellow at Brookings Institution, “Biological weapons: A plague upon all houses,” Foreign Policy, Dec 22, CMR]

It is a considerable comfort and undoubtedly a key to our survival that, so far, the main lines of defense against this threat have not depended on explicit policies or organized ¶ efforts. In the long course of evolution, the human body has developed physical barriers and a biochemical immune system whose sophistication and ¶ effectiveness exceed anything we could design or as yet even fully understand. But evolution is a sword that cuts both ways: New diseases¶ emerge, while old diseases mutate and adapt. Throughout history, there have been epidemics during which human immunity has ¶ broken down on an epic scale. An infectious agent believed to have been the plague bacterium killed an estimated 20 million people over a four-year period in the fourteenth ¶ century, including nearly one-quarter of Western Europe's population at the time. Since its recognized appearance in 1981, some 20 variations of the HIVvirus have ¶ infected an estimated 29.4 million worldwide, with 1.5 million people currently dying of aids each year. Malaria, tuberculosis, and ¶ cholera-once thought to be under control-are now making a comeback. As we enter the twenty-first century, changing conditions have enhanced the ¶ potential for widespread contagion. The rapid growth rate of the total world population, the unprecedented freedom of movement across international ¶ borders, and scientific advances that expand the capability for the deliberate manipulation of pathogens are all cause for worry that the problem might be greater in the ¶ future than it has ever been in the past. The threat of infectious pathogens is not just an issue of public health, but a fundamental security ¶ problem for the species as a whole.

#### Investment fund solves the underlying causes of illegal immigration by promoting growth in the Mexican economy – also eliminates border congestion

Hing 13 – Law Prof @ U of San Francisco

Bill Ong, Mexico: Too Big to Fail, 5/6, <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/bill-ong-hing/mexico-too-big-to-fail_b_3203620.html>, CMR

As President Obama visits Mexico to discuss, among other things, U.S. immigration reform, it's too bad that members of Congress who are involved in drafting legislation have left out a key ingredient to addressing undocumented immigration from Mexico: investing in Mexico in order to create jobs and ease the need for migrants to cross the border to seek employment. Apparently, the Obama Administration gets this. Ben Rhodes, an Obama deputy national security adviser, has acknowledged, "If the Mexican economy is growing, it forestalls the need for people to migrate to the United States to find work."¶ The fact that the Congress and the White House are tackling comprehensive immigration reform is good news for the estimated 11 million undocumented immigrants in the United States and their supporters. However, if the package does not include at least the first steps toward helping Mexico improve its economy and infrastructure, undocumented Mexican migration will not be solved permanently.¶ In 1994, we were told that NAFTA would solve the undocumented problem because jobs would be created in Mexico. But NAFTA contributed to huge job losses in Mexico. For example, Mexican corn farmers could not compete with heavily-subsidized U.S. corn farmers, and now Mexico imports most of its corn from the United States. For years, Mexico provided support to rural areas through systems of price supports for producers and reduced prices of agricultural products for consumers, but after NAFTA, Mexico withdrew this support. The United States, however, continued to produce subsidized corn in huge quantities at low prices, undercutting Mexico's corn prices; this subsidized system displaced Mexican workers because corn was a major source of rural income. The wages for low-wage workers have declined, and the rural poverty rate has increased. The idea of NAFTA-created jobs that would reduce pressure to migrate simply has not become a reality.¶ The fact that Mexico has faced job creation challenges under the NAFTA manufacturing model is even more troubling when placed in the context of the worldwide framework. Mexico was the first low-wage country that became a free trade partner with the United States and Canada. However, more and more free-trade agreements are being consummated, and WTO membership is growing. China's acceptance to the WTO created more competition for Mexico's manufacturing exports (especially in apparel and electronics). China is now the largest exporter to the United States, followed by Canada and Mexico. The United States and China are entering into more free-trade agreements with other countries, meaning other low-wage countries are gaining access to U.S. markets. U.S. agreements with Central American countries also mean that countries other than Mexico are using low-wage labor to produce goods headed for the United States.¶ Economic development in Mexico is the key to stopping undocumented migration. An investment fund to invest in roads, telecommunications, and post-secondary education in Mexico must be initiated. A national plan for infrastructure and transportation must be developed. Reducing geographical disparities within Mexico would likely decrease pressures to emigrate, and a first priority should be improving the road system from the U.S. border to the central and southern parts of Mexico. In spite of the growth in trade under NAFTA, significant investment in transportation and infrastructure has not occurred.¶ Although Mexico and the United States have developed the border area and NAFTA has helped to infuse new investment, the border region is burdened. By building up the central part of the country, border congestion could be relieved, and the whole system could be better managed.¶ Focusing on the educational system in Mexico also is key. Mexican students fall near the bottom in cross-country comparisons on basic literacy, math, and science. While the adult education level in the United States is twelve years, in Mexico, the level is about seven years. This low education level has severe implications for economic competitiveness and the standard of living for Mexicans whether they remain in Mexico or migrate to the United States.¶ One thing NAFTA has taught us is that, if we expect employment growth in Mexico to materialize as a result of trade agreements, investments must be targeted. We have to determine how to help Mexico's domestic industries by, for example, using domestic parts and supplies in production exports.¶ The rural parts of Mexico suffered under NAFTA. Subsistence farmers did not receive assistance or time to adjust to the new trade regime. Nothing was done to help protect their incomes as trade conditions changed. Forced to leave agriculture, these rural workers had little help moving into other sectors.¶ In order for any significant effect on Mexican migration to take place, significant investment in new technologies in small and medium-sized industries is necessary. Some of this new investment can be achieved through tax incentives to spur economic growth in the country's interior. Fruit and vegetable production development can absorb some of the rural workers previously displaced. Mexico's public infrastructure should be a major priority.¶ The recent Senate legislation on immigration reform crafted by the bi-partisan Gang of Eight allocates an additional $6.5 billion for border enforcement. The wisdom of huge, additional enforcement dollars targeting individuals who are entering in search of work to feed their families is questionable. Those funds would be spent so much more wisely and effectively on helping Mexico with its economy. The notion of a strong border may sound appealing, but a strong Mexican economy is the real way to reduce economic migration.

### Solvency

#### Investment fund reinvigorates US regional leadership and sustains long-term cooperation with Mexico while promoting successful integration

Pastor 12 – prof and director of the Center for North American Studies @ American

Robert A, Beyond the Continental Divide, July/August, <http://www.the-american-interest.com/article.cfm?piece=1269>, CMR

The Presidents of the United States and Mexico and the Prime Minister of Canada should seek to construct a North American Community that would invigorate their economies and improve the region’s competitiveness with Asia and Europe, enhance continental and public security, address more effectively the new transnational agenda, and design lean but effective trinational institutions for the 21st century. ¶ Such a Community would advance the principal goals of each country. For Mexico, it would narrow the development gap and lift its people to First-World status. For Canada, it would create institutions that would bind the three nations to agreed standards. For the United States, it would create a new style of leadership more aligned with long-term goals than with short-term special interests. For all three countries, it would allow a more cooperative and effective approach to transnational issues like transportation, infrastructure, immigration, anti-narcotics policies and the environment. ¶ The vision that undergirds this proposal is based on a principle of managed interdependence. If one country suffers a setback, all are hurt; success for one helps the others. The principle is simple and often lauded by leaders, but rarely acted on. If the United States actually accepted its “shared responsibility” for the drug problem, for example, it would get serious about making sure the 7,500 gun shops on the U.S. side of the border do not sell weapons to drug cartels. And if all three countries actually incorporated a sense of community, they would advertise “Buy North America” instead of “Buy USA”, “Buy Mexico” or “Buy Canada.”¶ The word “Community” refers to a group in which the members feel an affinity and desire to cooperate. It is not a union, and their relationship would differ from Europe’s, although, as already suggested, it should try to learn from Europe’s experience. It would be flexible enough for the three countries to define the new relationship that they would seek. Like the people and states of North America, the Community would be eminently pragmatic, choosing policies based on what advances the interests of all. ¶ By moving from a dual-bilateral relationship to a trilateral approach, the three countries could avoid duplication and clashing efforts. They would replace power imbalances with fair rules and would mobilize all three peoples to attack problems rather than each other. ¶ In December 2011, the U.S. and Canadian governments presented “Action Plans” on the border and regulatory convergence, and the U.S. and Mexican governments repeated the same exercise. The three countries restated the goal that they announced a decade before in the two “Smart Borders” agreements: to make the border efficient and secure. And they affirmed the need to harmonize regulations, just as they did in 2005, when they established the Security and Prosperity Partnership to avoid “the tyranny of small differences in regulations” that serve only to protect companies rather than benefit consumers. ¶ As it turned out, the “Action Plans” were really inaction plans. They set one-year deadlines for studies on virtually every issue identified a decade ago without ever trying to explain why the three governments had failed to achieve their goals. The Obama Administration waited until its third year to announce studies that won’t be completed until December 2012. The leaders called the plans “game-changers”, but anyone who bothered to read them knew they were playing the same old games. This was little more than a full-employment act for bureaucrats.¶ It is possible, of course, that a trilateral approach might not yield any more effective policies than the dual-bilateral efforts have so far. Nevertheless, it is clear that the only way to move forward on the agenda is for the leaders must grasp the North American opportunity, give it a high priority and organize their governments to accomplish their goals. It’s also clear we need to create institutions to help the three governments think continentally. At a minimum, we need a North American Advisory Commission to prepare continental options for all three leaders to consider and choose at annual summits. ¶ There is no paucity of problems to address. The three leaders should call for a North American Plan for Transportation and Infrastructure, for example, and establish a North American Investment fund that would connect the poorest southern regions of Mexico with the richer North American market. Such a fund would create the infrastructure in the south of Mexico that would attract investment and jobs and thus reduce migration to the north. ¶ To create a seamless market, the three countries should negotiate a common external tariff. That would eliminate the excessive “rules of origin” tax of about $500 billion per year, and the nominal common tariff could be used to fund the North American Investment Fund. Build roads, dismantle unnecessary border restrictions, expand educational opportunities across the continent, harmonize and raise environmental and labor standards, training tri-national teams of customs officers—these small steps could begin to invigorate the sleeping giant of North America.

**AND, Canada will follow US lead**

**Pastor 8** – Director @ Center for North American Studies

Robert A, “The Solution to North America’s Triple Problem: The Case for a North American Investment Fund”, Year 2, No. 2, January, <http://www.american.edu/sis/cnas/upload/triple_problem_pastor.pdf>, CMR

**In addition to economic interests, there are three reasons** why **Canada should want** ¶ **to build a North American Community and contribute to a fund to narrow the** ¶ **development gap**. First, **Canada is a multilateral institution-builder and there is no** ¶ **relationship more important to Canada than with the U**nited **S**tates (James, Michaud, ¶ O’Reilly, 2007, ch. 1). It follows that a tri-national institution could be constructed in a ¶ manner that would serve Canada’s long-term interests in assuring that the U.S. negotiates ¶ fairly and complies with the rules of an agreement. **Second**, **Canada wants the U.S. to** ¶ **pay attention to its concerns and is frustrated that it does not. A joint approach with** ¶ **Mexico,** which can gain US attention because of the large Mexican-American population, ¶ **would certainly assist Canada**. But Mexico and Canada are likely to be more effective if ¶ they pursue fair rules rather than appear as if they are conspiring against the U.S. ¶ **The three governments should set the goal of helping Mexico achieve a sustained** ¶ **rate of growth for at least one decade of at least 6 percent per year**. If one assumes that ¶ the U.S. and Canada maintain a growth rate of 3 percent, the income gap would be ¶ reduced by 20 percent in the first decade and, hopefully, provide the momentum to close ¶ the gap within 40-50 years. While it would be desirable for the gap to be closed, the ¶ trajectory may be as important. If Mexicans see the gap closing in a consistent way, selfperceptions could change, and that could mean that fewer Mexicans would emigrate.

1. For a full analysis of the when and how oil dependence leaves states vulnerable to coercion, see Rosemary A. Kelanic, “Black Gold and Blackmail: The Politics of International Oil Coercion” (PhD dissertation, University of Chicago, 2011). [↑](#endnote-ref-1)
2. For important exceptions, see Kelanic, “Black Gold and Blackmail.” [↑](#endnote-ref-2)
3. Jerome B. Cohen, *Japan’s Economy in War and Reconstruction* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 1949). [↑](#endnote-ref-3)
4. On the security dilemma see Robert Jervis, “Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma,” *World Politics*, Vol. 30, No. 2 (January 1978), pp. 167-214; and Charles L. Glaser, “The Security Dilemma Revisited,” *World Politics*, Vol. 50, No. 1 (October 1997), pp. 171-201. [↑](#endnote-ref-4)
5. In terms of bargaining theory, see Robert Powell, *Bargaining in the Shadow of Power* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999), Chp. 3. [↑](#endnote-ref-5)
6. For a generally skeptical analysis of the standard resource war arguments see David G. Victor, “What Resource Wars,” *The National Interest* (November/December 2007). [↑](#endnote-ref-6)
7. For related points, see Shaffer, *Energy Politics*, pp. 67-70, who identifies additional examples that I do not address, including the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea and the Arctic Circle. [↑](#endnote-ref-7)
8. Still another path is for a state to intervene in an energy-driven conflict to protect its access to oil; this is an example of how various mechanisms could overlap with each other. [↑](#endnote-ref-8)
9. This can be understood as a form of alliance entrapment; see Glenn H. Snyder, “The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics,” *World Politics*, Vol. 36, No. 4 (July 1984), pp. 461-495. [↑](#endnote-ref-9)
10. For analysis arguing that the conventional wisdom greatly exaggerates the economic cost of disruptions and that the costs of most disruptions would be too small to warrant U.S. military intervention, see Eugene Gholz and Daryl G. Press, “Protecting ‘The Prize’: Oil and the U.S. National Interest,” *Security Studies*, Vol. 19, No. 3 (2010), pp. 453-485. [↑](#endnote-ref-10)
11. Deutch and Schlesinger, Chairs, *National Security Consequences of U.S. Oil Dependency*, p. 53. [↑](#endnote-ref-11)
12. Caitlin Talmadge, “Closing Time: Assessing the Iranian Threat to the Strait of Hormuz,” *International Security*, Vol. 33, No. 1 (Summer 2008), p. 87-88; and William D. O’Neil, “Correspondence: Costs and Difficulties of Blocking the Strait of Hormuz,” *International Security*, Vol. 33, No. 3 (Winter 2008/09), pp. 190, 195. [↑](#endnote-ref-12)
13. Talmadge, “Closing Time.” [↑](#endnote-ref-13)
14. Barry R. Posen, “U.S. Security Policy in a Nuclear-Armed World, Or: What if Iraq had had Nuclear Weapons?,” *Security Studies*, Vol. 6, No. 3 (Spring 1997), pp. 1-31, quote at pp. 4-5. [↑](#endnote-ref-14)
15. Talmadge, “Closing Time.” [↑](#endnote-ref-15)
16. For discussion of some of the implications of various types of missile basing and the incentives for counter-nuclear attacks, see Charles L. Glaser and Steve Fetter, “Counterforce Revisited: Assessing the Nuclear Posture Review’s New Missions,” *International Security*, Vol. 30, No. 2 (Fall 2005), pp. 84-126. This type preventive attack would be tactical, not strategic, in that it would reflect the dangers of a change in the operational capability of deployed forces rather than of a change in the underlying balance of power that would make possible a shift in deployed capabilities. [↑](#endnote-ref-16)
17. On this type of danger see Barry R. Posen, *Inadvertent Escalation, Conventional War and Nuclear Risks* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991). [↑](#endnote-ref-17)